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 iterated belief revision


Incompatibilities Between Iterated and Relevance-Sensitive Belief Revision

Aravanis, Theofanis (University of Patras) | Peppas, Pavlos (University of Patras, Greece) | Williams, Mary-Anne (University of Technology Sydney, Australia)

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

The AGM paradigm for belief change, as originally introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, lacks any guidelines for the process of iterated revision. One of the most influential work addressing this problem is Darwiche and Pearl's approach (DP approach, for short), which, despite its well-documented shortcomings, remains to this date the most dominant. In this article, we make further observations on the DP approach. In particular, we prove that the DP postulates are, in a strong sense, inconsistent with Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom (P), extending previous initial conflicts. Immediate consequences of this result are that an entire class of intuitive revision operators, which includes Dalal's operator, violates the DP postulates, as well as that the Independence postulate and Spohn's conditionalization are inconsistent with axiom (P). The whole study, essentially, indicates that two fundamental aspects of the revision process, namely, iteration and relevance, are in deep conflict, and opens the discussion for a potential reconciliation towards a comprehensive formal framework for knowledge dynamics.


Generalized Ranking Kinematics for Iterated Belief Revision

Sezgin, Meliha (Technical University of Dortmund) | Kern-Isberner, Gabriele (Technical University of Dortmund)

AAAI Conferences

Probability kinematics is a leading paradigm in probabilistic belief change. It is based on the idea that conditional beliefs should be independent from changes of their antecedents' probabilities. In this paper, we propose a re-interpretation of this paradigm for Spohn's ranking functions which we call Generalized Ranking Kinematics as a new principle for iterated belief revision of ranking functions by sets of conditional beliefs. This general setting also covers iterated revision by propositional beliefs. We then present c-revisions as belief change methodology that satisfies Generalized Ranking Kinematics.


Iterated Belief Revision Under Resource Constraints: Logic as Geometry

Guralnik, Dan P., Koditschek, Daniel E.

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We propose a variant of iterated belief revision designed for settings with limited computational resources, such as mobile autonomous robots. The proposed memory architecture---called the {\em universal memory architecture} (UMA)---maintains an epistemic state in the form of a system of default rules similar to those studied by Pearl and by Goldszmidt and Pearl (systems $Z$ and $Z^+$). A duality between the category of UMA representations and the category of the corresponding model spaces, extending the Sageev-Roller duality between discrete poc sets and discrete median algebras provides a two-way dictionary from inference to geometry, leading to immense savings in computation, at a cost in the quality of representation that can be quantified in terms of topological invariants. Moreover, the same framework naturally enables comparisons between different model spaces, making it possible to analyze the deficiencies of one model space in comparison to others. This paper develops the formalism underlying UMA, analyzes the complexity of maintenance and inference operations in UMA, and presents some learning guarantees for different UMA-based learners. Finally, we present simulation results to illustrate the viability of the approach, and close with a discussion of the strengths, weaknesses, and potential development of UMA-based learners.


Revising by an Inconsistent Set of Formulas

Delgrande, James (Simon Fraser University)

AAAI Conferences

This paper presents an approach to belief revision in which revision is a function from a belief state and a finite set of formulas to a new belief state. In the interesting case, the set for revision S may be inconsistent but individual members of S are consistent. We argue that S will still contain interesting information regarding revision; in particular, maximum consistent subsets of S will determine candidate formulas for the revision process, and the agent's associated faithful ranking will determine the plausibility of such candidate formulas. Postulates and semantic conditions characterizing this approach are given, and representation results are provided. As a consequence of this approach, we argue that revision by a sequence of formulas, usually considered as a problem of iterated revision, is more appropriately regarded as revision by the possibly-inconsistent set of these formulas. Hence we suggest that revision by a sequence of formulas is foremost a problem of (uniterated) set revision.